Read More《飞速扩张20多年后，Steam走向垄断了吗?》
Positive Reviews: Steam’s Ecological Moat is an Inevitable Result of Market Selection
Steam’s absolute dominance in the PC game distribution field is, in essence, the result of the high – degree fit between its ecological moat built over more than 20 years and user needs. The formation of this advantage cannot be simply summarized by the word “monopoly”.
From the user’s perspective, Steam’s success stems from its in – depth understanding of players’ needs and long – term investment. Data shows that the number of Steam’s concurrent online users increased from 20 million in 2020 to over 40 million in 2025, and the peak concurrent in – game users exceeded 12 million. This growth trajectory directly reflects users’ dependence on the platform. This dependence is not forcibly formed. Instead, through features such as the “library”, “achievement system”, “game playtime statistics”, and “community reviews”, Steam has upgraded the game consumption from a simple “buy – play” behavior to a composite experience that includes collection, social interaction, and identity recognition. For example, the game library accumulated by players on Steam is not only a digital asset but also a symbol of their game preferences and qualifications; the game playtime and achievement system have become tools for interaction and self – expression among players. This ecological stickiness makes the user migration cost extremely high. Switching platforms means losing historical data, social relationships, and identity tags. This is the core reason why challengers such as Epic and Microsoft, even by offering a “12% low revenue share” to attract developers, still find it difficult to shake Steam’s user base.
From the developer’s perspective, Steam’s market coverage ability is its irreplaceable core value. Although developers are dissatisfied with the 30% revenue share, Steam remains the largest “traffic entrance” for global PC games. Take the domestic hit game “Black Myth: Wukong” as an example. Its sales on the Steam platform accounted for 82% (23 million out of 28 million) of the total sales. This data intuitively reflects Steam’s strong ability to reach global players, especially in emerging markets (for example, users in the Chinese region account for more than one – third). For developers, giving up Steam means voluntarily giving up the mainstream user group; while choosing Steam allows them to quickly open up the market through the platform’s recommendation algorithm, holiday promotions (such as summer and winter sales), and localization operations (such as support for Simplified Chinese). In addition, Steam’s continuously optimized developer tools (such as language – weighted reviews and in – game performance monitors) are also lowering the development threshold and improving operational efficiency. This two – way empowerment of “users – developers” further consolidates its market position.
From the perspective of industry development, Steam was once a “revolutionary” in the digitalization of PC games. When it was launched in 2003, it ended the offline distribution model of the CD – ROM era and promoted the legalization and globalization of games. After 2010, through mechanisms such as the “Greenlight Program” and “Steam Direct”, it provided independent games with the opportunity to compete with 3A blockbusters on the same stage, directly promoting the golden age of global independent games (in 2024, 224 games on Steam had revenues of over one million US dollars, and many of them were works by small and medium – sized teams). This “infrastructure” attribute makes it the “water, electricity, and gas” of the PC game ecosystem. The dependence of developers and players on it is, in essence, the dependence on an efficient and mature distribution system, rather than “forced obedience” to a single enterprise.
Negative Reviews: Behind the Monopoly Dispute is the Conflict between Ecological Hegemony and Industry Fairness
Although Steam’s success is reasonable, its market position has indeed raised concerns about “ecological hegemony”. The collective lawsuits from developers and the high – proportion “monopoly” recognition in industry surveys (72% of developers believe that Steam has a monopoly) all point to its possible anti – competitive behavior and imbalanced profit distribution.
Firstly, the “forced same – price clause” suppresses market competition. According to the internal emails disclosed in the lawsuit, Valve requires developers to offer the same pricing on other platforms as on Steam. Otherwise, they may cancel the promotional exposure on Steam. This policy directly limits the possibility of emerging platforms attracting users through price differences. As a result, even if platforms such as Epic and GOG reduce their revenue share, they still find it difficult to form competitiveness in terms of price. For example, if a game is sold at a lower price on Epic, Steam will “punish” the developer by reducing the recommendation slots and restricting promotional activities, ultimately forcing the developer to maintain the same price across all platforms. Naturally, users lack the motivation to switch platforms. This practice of “replacing market competition with platform rules” is regarded by developers as “using market dominance to stifle competition”.
Secondly, the “graduated revenue – share mechanism” is unfairly tilted towards small and medium – sized developers. Steam’s revenue – share rule is as follows: 30% is taken for revenues below 10 million US dollars, 25% for the part between 10 million and 50 million US dollars, and 20% for revenues above 50 million US dollars. This design seemingly encourages “more work, more pay”, but in fact, it further strengthens the advantages of big – budget games. Big companies’ 3A blockbusters are more likely to cross the 50 – million – dollar threshold and enjoy a lower revenue share. However, the revenues of small and medium – sized developers’ games are mostly below 10 million US dollars, and they have to bear the highest 30% revenue share. Data shows that the “break – even line” for overseas independent game developers is about 500,000 US dollars. But Steam’s high revenue share directly compresses their profit margins, resulting in the common dilemma of “after painstakingly developing a game, the platform takes nearly one – third of the revenue”. This “robbing the poor to help the rich” revenue – share model exacerbates the Matthew effect in the industry.
Finally, the “ecological closure” potentially suppresses innovation. Although Steam’s user stickiness comes from ecological construction, it may also lead to “innovation inertia”. For example, Valve only uses 79 employees to support the operation of the Steam platform, but it can obtain billions of dollars in annual revenue (as disclosed in the 2021 financial data). This “high – profit, low – investment” model may weaken its motivation to improve services. If an emerging platform wants to challenge Steam, it not only needs to solve the problem of user migration cost but also needs to reach or even surpass Steam in terms of content richness (Steam has more than 50,000 games), localization (covering 48 languages), and payment methods (supporting more than 200 global payment methods). This is almost an “impossible task” for small and medium – sized platforms. In the long run, the PC game distribution market may fall into a stagnant state of “one superpower and many weak ones”, suppressing the innovation of new business models and technologies (such as cloud gaming and cross – platform interoperability).
Advice for Entrepreneurs: Find a Way to Break the Deadlock and Achieve Balance in the Steam Ecosystem
For game developers, Steam is a core channel that they “have to rely on”, but over – reliance also means risks. The following suggestions can help developers reduce their dependence on a single platform while seizing market opportunities:
Distribute across multiple platforms to diversify risks: Even if Steam is the main source of income, developers should still actively deploy on other platforms (such as Epic, GOG, and itch.io). For example, independent games can first test market feedback on itch.io and then launch on Steam. 3A blockbusters can sign limited – time exclusive agreements with Epic (such as “Cyberpunk 2077” once cooperated with Epic) to obtain additional revenue – share discounts. In addition, self – building an official website or direct sales through third – party platforms (such as Humble Bundle) can not only enhance user stickiness but also reduce dependence on Steam.
Build a self – owned user ecosystem: Developers can convert Steam’s “traffic” into their own “retained traffic” through community operations (Discord, QQ groups), membership systems (paid DLCs, season passes), and in – game social functions (online systems, player communities). For example, “Monster Hunter: World” successfully transformed Steam users into long – term players through its in – game online system and hunter community, reducing its dependence on platform recommendation slots.
Pay attention to policy and legal risks: The current anti – monopoly lawsuit against Steam may promote the adjustment of industry rules (such as mandatory opening of some data interfaces and reduction of the revenue – share ratio). Developers should actively follow the progress of the lawsuit, participate in policy advocacy of industry organizations (such as the International Game Developers Association IGDA), and promote a more fair revenue – share mechanism and platform rules.
For entrepreneurs of emerging distribution platforms, challenging Steam requires breaking away from the single competition logic of “low revenue share” and instead seeking breakthroughs in user experience and ecological differentiation:
Dig deep into vertical fields: Instead of competing with Steam for the full – category market, it is better to focus on niche markets (such as independent games, retro games, and cloud games). For example, itch.io focuses on the distribution of independent games and mods and attracts core users through a low revenue share (10%) and a strong community atmosphere. GOG specializes in DRM – free (Digital Rights Management) games and attracts players who value game ownership.
Enhance user value rather than subsidize developers: The lesson of Epic shows that only relying on “low revenue share” to attract developers cannot retain users. The platform needs to form differentiation in user experience (such as a more concise store interface and a more intelligent recommendation algorithm), additional services (such as game cloud storage and cross – platform achievement synchronization), and social functions (such as in – game chat and live – streaming integration). For example, the Microsoft Store can combine the Xbox ecosystem and launch cross – platform online functions for PC and consoles to attract Xbox players to migrate.
Leverage new technologies and new scenarios: Emerging technologies such as cloud gaming and the metaverse provide opportunities for distribution platforms to break the deadlock. For example, a distribution platform based on cloud gaming can lower the hardware threshold for users and attract non – core players. A metaverse platform can combine games with virtual social interaction and create a new scenario of “playing while socializing”.
In conclusion, the “monopoly dispute” over Steam is, in essence, the industry’s demand for a balance between “ecological hegemony” and “fair competition”. For entrepreneurs, the key is to take advantage of Steam’s traffic advantages while reducing risks through differentiated strategies and ecological construction, and ultimately promote the PC game distribution market to develop in a more open and diversified direction.
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