Read More《砸300万开店终翻盘，“创业十年，我想明白了一件事”》
Positive Reviews: The “Survival Wisdom” After a Decade of Trial and Error, Providing a Replicable Transformation Model for Tea Drink Entrepreneurship
In the brutal competition of the new tea drink industry, where a batch of brands thrive each year and the landscape changes every three years, the story of Wu Mengmeng’s four entrepreneurial attempts over a decade and finally achieving success is not only a personal triumph but also reflects a set of “survival methodologies” worthy of reference for the industry. Her transformation practice demonstrates the sobriety and resilience of entrepreneurs in four dimensions: trend insight, product design, scenario construction, and profit logic, offering new ideas for breaking the deadlock in the highly homogenized tea drink market.
I. Accurately Capture the Category Life Cycle, Replace “Following the Trend” with “Trend Prediction”
The core logic of Wu Mengmeng’s transformation lies in her profound understanding of the “category life cycle.” From the early nitrogen-infused fruit tea and space experience stores to the new Chinese-style fresh milk tea, she has caught every industry upsurge but was also able to shift in a timely manner when a category entered the “fatigue period” – this stands in sharp contrast to the short-sighted behavior of most entrepreneurs who “copy products from leading brands.” In 2024, when the fresh milk tea market was caught in a “price war + traffic involution” due to the entry of leading brands, through market research, she found that consumers’ health needs had evolved from “sugar and powder reduction” to “purer tea.” As a typical representative of “the original taste of tea,” matcha not only meets the health trend but also has a cognitive gap (for example, consumers mistakenly think matcha is an additive), which is the window period for the rise of this category. This ability to “predict trends rather than chase them” is essentially a deep observation of the evolution of consumer needs. In the past decade of the new tea drink industry, consumers’ upgrading path from “drinking sweet beverages” to “drinking fresh fruits” and then to “drinking pure tea” has been accurately refined by her into the core logic of “getting closer to tea,” providing underlying support for the transformation.
II. Gradient Products + Scenario Education to Solve the Problem of “Popularizing Niche Categories”
As a relatively niche category, matcha often falls into the dilemma of “being well-received but having low sales” due to its “high cognitive threshold” and “low taste acceptance.” Wu Mengmeng’s strategy to break the deadlock is a “textbook example of user thinking”: on the one hand, she uses basic products priced around 20 yuan (such as “Only This Green”) to lower the threshold for consumers to try and attract the general public; on the other hand, through the hand-beaten matcha bar in the 300-square-meter flagship store, she provides a deep scenario of “observation – experience – communication” to address cognitive pain points such as “Is matcha a type of tea?” and “What’s the difference between hand-beating and machine brewing?” At the same time, she extends the consumption scenarios by offering matcha desserts and retail matcha powder, forming a consumption gradient of “high-frequency drinks – medium-frequency desserts – low-frequency retail.” This gradual education method that “does not force consumers to make a one-step choice” not only maintains the brand’s professionalism (such as emphasizing the flavor differences of high-grade matcha) but also avoids the situation of a niche category being “too highbrow to find many followers.” More importantly, she did not abandon other categories just because she focused on matcha – retaining products like fruit tea and cocoa essentially uses the “social attribute” to retain group consumption scenarios (such as corporate group orders), and drives the associated sales of matcha through an “impure” product line. This design that prioritizes “consumer needs over category purity” shows her precise control of consumption scenarios.
III. From “Enclosure Movement” to “Single-Store Profitability,” a Sober Recognition of Returning to the Business Essence
Against the backdrop of the industry’s general pursuit of the “small-store model + rapid expansion,” Wu Mengmeng chose to “mainly operate directly + strictly control franchising” and set the goal of “making every store profitable,” which can be regarded as a correction of the “hype” in the new tea drink industry. In the past decade, due to the low entry threshold, the tea drink industry has attracted a large number of entrepreneurs. Many brands adopted the “light-asset franchising” model for rapid expansion, resulting in out-of-control quality control and difficulties in single-store profitability, and finally falling into the vicious cycle of “opening stores – closing stores – opening stores again.” Wu Mengmeng’s strategy is to operate all stores directly in the Hangzhou market and strictly control the proportion of franchised stores in the future. She polishes the “replicable systematic capabilities” (such as supply chain management and store operation) through direct operation, and only considers expansion after ensuring single-store profitability. This logic of “surviving first and then talking about scale” essentially returns to the business essence – only when the single-store model is proven can the brand have the ability to continuously generate blood; only by controlling the expansion pace can the brand avoid over-drafting due to out-of-control management. Her practice proves that in the stage when the industry’s dividend fades and the competition enters the “fine-grained operation” stage, “slowness” may actually be the foundation of “quickness.”
Negative Reviews: Potential Risks and Industry Limitations Behind the Transformation
Although Wu Mengmeng’s success is worthy of recognition, her transformation path also has limitations under specific circumstances, and entrepreneurs need to be vigilant about the potential risks of some strategies.
I. The Pressure of “High Investment – Slow Return” in the Large-Store Model
The heavy-asset model of investing 3 million yuan in a 300-square-meter flagship store can strengthen the scenario experience and category education, but it also means higher fixed costs (rent, labor, and decoration depreciation) and a longer return period. Taking the old urban area of Hangzhou as an example, the monthly rent of a 300-square-meter store may exceed 100,000 yuan (even higher in the core business district). Coupled with labor costs (such as professional training for the staff at the hand-beaten matcha bar), the monthly revenue of a single store needs to be stably above 150,000 yuan to cover the basic costs (calculated according to the conventional cost structure of the catering industry). Although the daily revenue of Wu Mengmeng’s flagship store has reached over 10,000 yuan (monthly average of over 300,000 yuan), is this model replicable in non-core cities or areas with weak consumption power? If the popularity of the matcha market declines in the future, the “sunk cost” of heavy-asset stores may become a burden. In addition, the large-store model has extremely high requirements for operational efficiency – how to balance the “in-depth experience” and “quick cup delivery” (especially during peak hours) to avoid customer loss due to complex service processes is still a topic that needs continuous optimization.
II. The “Competition Window Period” of the Matcha Market May Shorten
The key basis for Wu Mengmeng to choose the matcha market is “rising demand + mature supply chain,” but this also means that the threshold of the market is lowering. Currently, regional brands such as Qu Chashan and Baozang Oasis have made matcha a major product. If leading brands like Luckin and Heytea follow up (such as launching matcha product series), they may quickly squeeze the space of new brands with their brand influence, supply chain cost advantages, and traffic resources. In addition, although the “health attribute” of matcha meets the trend, consumers’ demand for “pure tea” may be further segmented (such as shifting to loose-leaf tea or cold-brewed tea). If Wu Mengmeng fails to continuously iterate her products (such as developing seasonal limited editions or combining the concept of medicinal and edible homology), she may face the risk of “after the category education is completed, consumers shift to other types of tea.”
III. The Limitation of the Direct-Operation Model on the Expansion Speed
The strategy of mainly operating directly can ensure quality control and single-store profitability, but it also limits the brand’s expansion speed. The “scale effect” is crucial in the new tea drink industry – only when reaching a certain number of stores can a brand establish advantages in supply chain bargaining, brand influence, and customer reach. If Wu Mengmeng adheres to the logic of “ensuring the profitability of each store first,” she may form an advantage in the regional market (such as the Yangtze River Delta), but the cycle of national expansion will be lengthened. In addition, strictly controlling franchising can avoid “scalping” – style expansion, but it may also miss some high-quality franchisee resources (such as partners familiar with the local market). How to find a balance between “control” and “openness” is a problem that needs to be solved in the future.
IV. The Potential Impact of the “Impure” Product Line on Brand Positioning
Retaining non-matcha categories such as fruit tea and cocoa can meet the group consumption needs, but it may blur the brand’s core positioning. When consumers mention “Xianji,” if their first association is not a “professional matcha brand” but an “integrated tea drink store,” the value of the previous scenario education (such as the hand-beaten matcha bar and matcha retail) may be diluted. Especially in the context of intensified competition in the matcha market, the brand needs a clearer “differentiated label” (such as “representative of high-end Chinese matcha”), and too many non-core categories may weaken the recognition of this label.
Suggestions for Entrepreneurs: Key Survival Rules for Tea Drink Entrepreneurship from the “Wu Mengmeng Model”
The experiences and lessons of Wu Mengmeng’s decade of trial and error provide the following replicable survival rules for tea drink entrepreneurs:
I. Use the “Category Life Cycle” to Guide Strategic Choices and Be Vigilant Against “Trend-Following Entrepreneurship”
Entrepreneurs need to establish the thinking of the “category life cycle”: any category has an introduction period (emerging demand), a growth period (rapid expansion), a maturity period (homogeneous involution), and a decline period (demand transfer). Entering the market during the growth period can enjoy the dividends, but entrepreneurs need to plan for transformation before the maturity period; if they enter the market following the trend during the maturity period, they are likely to fall into the dead end of “price war + traffic anxiety.” Specifically in the tea drink industry, the “fresh milk tea” has currently entered the maturity period, the “pure tea” (such as matcha and loose-leaf tea) is in the growth period, and the “fruit tea” may accelerate into the maturity period due to the high degree of supply chain standardization. Entrepreneurs can judge the market opportunities accordingly.
II. User Education Needs to Be Driven by Both “Scenario” and “Product” to Avoid “Self-Indulgent Innovation”
To popularize a niche category, both the “cognitive threshold” and the “experience threshold” need to be addressed. Wu Mengmeng’s practice shows that the scenario (such as the hand-beaten matcha bar in the large store) is the “experience entrance” for user education, and the product (such as the 20-yuan basic product) is the “traffic entrance” to lower the trial threshold, and both are indispensable. If entrepreneurs launch innovative categories (such as herbal tea or fermented tea), they need to design a combined strategy of “basic products for attracting customers + premium advanced products + scenario-based experience” to avoid customer loss due to “products being too professional” or “scenarios being too shabby.”
III. Single-Store Profitability Is the Prerequisite for Expansion, and Reject the Trap of “Sacrificing Profits for Scale”
The new tea drink industry has entered the “fine-grained operation” stage from the “enclosure movement” stage, and entrepreneurs need to take “single-store profitability” as the core indicator. Before expansion, the following models need to be verified: whether the single-store revenue can cover costs such as rent, labor, and raw materials (it is recommended that the gross profit margin be maintained above 60% and the net profit margin above 15%); whether the supply chain can support stable product quality and cost control; whether the store operation process is efficient (such as cup delivery time and inventory turnover). If the single-store model is not proven, blind expansion will only accelerate the demise.
IV. Brand Positioning Needs to Be “Focused + Flexible” to Avoid the Extremes of “Purification” and “Diversification”
Brand positioning needs to find a balance between “focus” and “flexibility”: focus on the core category (such as Wu Mengmeng’s matcha) to build professional recognition, and flexibly supplement related categories (such as fruit tea and desserts) to meet the scenario needs. Two extremes need to be vigilant: one is excessive “purification” leading to a narrow customer group (such as only selling matcha and losing group order scenarios); the other is excessive “diversification” blurring the brand label (such as simultaneously promoting matcha, fruit tea, and coffee, causing consumer confusion). It is recommended to design a product structure of “7:2:1”: 70% core category (strengthening the label), 20% related categories (meeting scenario needs), and 10% innovative categories (maintaining freshness).
V. Choose the Expansion Model Carefully, and the “Degree” of Direct Operation and Franchising Depends on the Brand Stage
For start-up brands, it is recommended to mainly operate directly in the early stage (1 – 3 stores), and polish the product, operation, and supply chain through direct operation; when the single-store model is proven and the brand influence is established (such as regional popularity and stable repurchase rate), a mixed model of “direct operation + franchising” can be tried, but franchisees need to be strictly screened (such as requiring catering experience and recognition of the brand concept), and a strong control system of “headquarters – region – store” needs to be established (such as unified training, regular store inspections, and data monitoring). Avoid opening “threshold-free franchising” for quick cash recovery, otherwise, out-of-control quality may backfire on the brand.
Wu Mengmeng’s story is essentially a successful case of “cognitive upgrade” driving “strategic transformation.” She has verified a simple truth over a decade: in a red-ocean market, there are no miracles in entrepreneurship, only a sober judgment of trends, a deep understanding of consumers, and a firm adherence to the business essence. For tea drink entrepreneurs, instead of blindly chasing trends, they should, like Wu Mengmeng, first figure out “what consumers need,” “what they can offer,” and “how to make continuous profits.” Perhaps this is the ultimate survival rule to survive the industry cycle.
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